Abstract-With the wide deployment of network facilities and the increasing requirement of network reliability, the disruptive event like natural disaster, power outage or malicious attack has become a non-negligible threat to the current communication network. Such disruptive event can simultaneously destroy all devices in a specific geographical area and affect many network based applications for a long time. Hence, it is essential to build disaster-resilient network for future highly survivable communication services. In this paper, we focus on the integrated approach through the technique of software defined networking to mitigate disaster risks while cut down the investment and management costs. Our design consists of a sub-graph based proactive protection approach for fast rerouting at the network nodes and a splicing approach at the controller for effective postdisaster restoration. Such a systematic design is implemented in OpenFlow framework through the Mininet emulator and Nox controller. Numerical results show that our approach can achieve high reliability, fast recovery and low control overhead.
I. INTRODUCTION
Networks having very high degree of interconnection are vulnerable to the disruptive events such as flood, earthquake, power outage, electronic attacks, etc. Such regional damages are usually unpredictable and may simultaneously destroy multiple network facilities in a specific geographical area, which result in a long period of network outages. For example, the east Japan earthquake on March 2011 caused 385 telephone offices stopped operation immediately, cut off millions of users from telephone service and even the emergency restoration took more than one month [1] .
The conventional techniques to maintain network continuity can not work well in case of disasters. Network protection, which relies on the expensive pre-allocated backup resources, may fail to deal with regional damage when the backup resources corrupt simultaneously with the primary ones. Restoration mechanism, which computes new routes based on the actual status of network, may introduce too long convergence time to meet the requirements of mission-critical and real-time applications, and leads to serious consequences like transient loops and blackholes [2] .
To build disaster-resilient networks, this paper focuses on leveraging the technique of SDN (Software Defined Networking) to exploit an effective combination of network protection (prior to damage) and restoration (after damage), which enables more intelligent resource reallocation as well as cuts down the investment and management costs. SDN decouples the network control plane from the data plane, and has been successfully deployed in the operator's WAN and corporation's LAN to provide robust network services, e.g., the global carrier NTT communications networks, Google and Microsoft inter-datacenter WANs, etc [3] , [4] . Due to its intrinsic great flexibility and global management of the network, SDN is potentially suitable to execute an efficient recovery during a major disruption.
Generally, the SDN controller computes routes whenever a failure occurs. However, for the multiple failures caused by a catastrophic event, it is impractical to offload all the routing computation to the controller and insert the new rules into forwarding elements. This is because the dynamic route recomputation can lead to huge overhead. Moreover, inserting all new routes into SDN forwarding elements alongside is timeconsuming [5] and error-prone due to the consistent packet processing problem [6] , [7] .
Our key observation is that, the redundant resource reserved for the protection of single failure, can be scheduled through the SDN central coordinator with low overhead to enhance the network reliability against multiple failures caused by disaster. By doing so, the coordination system guarantees fast recovery in case of frequent single failure or a small number of multiple failures, and ensures good continuity to recover from the rarely happened but severe regional damage.
Our proposed system consists of two modules, the proactive local failure recovery module running at the switches and the reactive global restoration module running at the controller. The proactive protection module is able to handle frequent single failure through the preserved backup resources. Furthermore, to reduce the overhead of the controller, we consider the geographical distribution of network components such that a proportion of multiple failures caused by regional damage can also be locally handled. For the restoration module against large-scale regional damages, we give our splicing algorithm by efficiently reallocating the pre-computed backup resources to quickly rebuild the failed connections. The two modules are presented in Section III. We implement our approach by utilizing multiple tables pipeline processing and fast failover group table of OpenFlow [8] , the detail of which is introduced in Section IV. The performance and overhead of the proposed approach are analyzed through simulation in Section V.
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A. Related Work
The flexible restoration approaches through SDN have been recently proposed. Nguyen et al. [9] studied latency between a switch and a controller and confirmed the applicability of SDN on disaster-resilient WANs. Works in [10] , [11] studied using SDN to meet carrier-grade requirements and pointed out that the reactive approach may not be able to achieve sub50ms recovery. However, the above works did not consider the heavy controller overhead and the consistent packet processing problem [6] , [7] . To reduce the recovery time, Sgambelluri et al. [12] proposed the proactive segment protection. Kamamura et al. [13] gave a prototype to achieve IP fast rerouting using backup tables via autonomous OpenFlow controllers. The proposed proactive recovery can significantly reduce the recovery time. But, in face of region failure scenarios, the performance may be significantly decreased since the flexibility of SDN's global view is not used.
II. PRELIMINARY In this section, we first define the regional failure model and then explain the design goals and metrics of our approach.
A. Failure Model
Here, we adopt the commonly used deterministic circular failure model 1 . Definition 1: (Regional Failures) is a circular area randomly placed in the physical network. Any network component (e.g. node or link) intersecting within the failure region is destroyed and removed from the graph which results in a loss of connectivity between end nodes.
B. Design Goals and Reliability Metrics
We discuss our design goals and used metrics that widely adopted in previous works [14] , [15] .
1) High Reachability: Reachability is introduced to evaluate the capacity of network recovery to reset the connection between pairs of disconnected nodes, which can be defined as follows, Definition 2: (Recovery Ratio)
Recovery Ratio = number of recovered paths number of recoverable paths We call a disconnected routing path "recoverable" if both end nodes are alive and they are not physically separated.
2) Low Stretch: We adopt the notation of stretch to measure the ratio of alternate path length over the expected shortest path length.
Definition 3: (Stretch) Given a pair of end-nodes u, v ∈ V in traffic matrix T M, let dist * (u, v) denote the shortest path from u to v in the underlying topology after failure occurs. Let dist(u, v) denote the alternate path from u to v discovered by the restoration approach. Then the stretch of the alternate path is
3) Fast Recovery: We apply the notation of recovery time to evaluate the speed of failed connection reestablishment.
Definition 4: (Recovery Time) Recovery time is the interval for the system to rebuild the failed connection between a pair of nodes.
4) Low Overhead:
We try to reduce the load of the controller by locally restoring the failed connections. The effectiveness of this approach is measured through the metric of controller overhead.
Definition 5: (Controller Overhead) Controller overhead is defined as the proportion of reconnection requests that need to be processed by the controller.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN
In this section, we first define the problem of SDN network reliability against regional damage. Then we introduce our solution to the problem, which consists of two modules: the proactive Backup Topologies Generation Module for local recovery and the reactive Splicing Module for global restoration.
A. Overview of System Design
The problem to be solved can be demonstrated as follows:
Given a network G(V, E) and a central controller C, how can we efficiently use the redundancies pre-installed for fast failover against single failures to survive the large-scale multiple failures caused by regional damage.
To solve the above problem, we apply the SDN framework for failure recovery. Our design consists of two modules, a proactive local failure recovery module working in the forwarding plane and a reactive global restoration module running in the control plane. The single failure and a small number of multiple failures are handled by pre-install rules in the forwarding plane. The rest of failures are handled by the Splicing Module in the control plane as illustrated in Fig. 1 .
Concretely, the Backup Topologies Generation Module takes the original graph G as input, and is responsible for generating k backup topologies {G 1 . . . G k }. Routing tables {T 1 . . . T k } are computed and installed based on {G 1 . . . G k }, which can be easily applied in the SDN framework. For the backup topologies generation, we refer to the approach of Multiple Routing Configurations (MRC) [16] , [17] , whose basic idea is to prepare multiple backup topologies for the potential single or link failures. To ensure the backup topologies is able to handle part of multiple failures possible, we extend it by considering the geographical distribution of network components.
For the large-scale multiple failures that needed to be handled by the controller, a straightforward idea is to compute new routes on the controller for each failed flow and install all the new rules into the corresponding switches ( [9] - [11] ). However, such an operation is time consuming and error-prone due to the consistent packet processing problem. Here, we exploit the usage of pre-computed backup topologies to rebuild the failed connections, and a splicing algorithm is proposed in the Splicing Module at the controller to find new paths. 
B. Review of MRC (Multiple Routing Configurations)
For the completeness of our work, we first give a brief review of the MRC algorithm. The key idea of MRC routing algorithm is to prepare multiple backup topologies, and select a proper backup topology in accordance with the current network failure state [17] . In each backup topology, some nodes or links are defined as isolated nodes or links such that their failures will not affect the connection of others. This is achieved by assigning the isolated link a high weight such that the isolated link will be excluded from the backup routing path (since the link with a high weight will not be selected by shortest path routing mechanisms).
Upon detecting an adjacent node or link failure, the detecting node would select a backup topology in which the failed nexthop link is isolated. Then it will tag packets with the selected backup topology ID to notify the subsequent nodes to forward packets based on this backup topology. Fig. 2 shows the generated backup topologies. Every node is isolated in exactly one backup topology. Consider a flow with (src=1, dst=3), normally its routing path is 1 → 2 → 3 based on shortest path in G. Assume node 2 failed and node 1 detected the failure. Since node 2 is isolated in G 1 , node 1 would tag the packet with tag 1 which refers to backup topology G 1 . The alongside nodes will also forward the packet belonging to the failed flow based on G 1 . Thus, the routing path from 1 to 3 becomes 1 → 4 → 7 → 8 → 3.
MRC is originally designed to achieve fast rerouting against single link or node failure. To leverage its pre-installed redundancies, we extend the original MRC algorithm to survive multiple failures.
C. Backup Topologies Generation Module
This module is responsible for generating backup topologies. With regard to multiple failures, two constraints should be satisfied:
(1) The fast rerouting property against single failure should be inherited to achieve fast rerouting against single link or node failure. (2) Geographically adjacent nodes in the original network topology should be isolated in the same backup topology as much as possible. Constraint (2) aims to minimize the number of backup topologies that may be affected during regional failures. Since the problem of backup topologies generation w.r.t. constraint (1) is NP-complete [16] , we focus on developing heuristic algorithm to solve the above problem.
The algorithm takes the original network topology G and the required number of backup topologies k as its input. The output of the algorithm is k backup topologies {G 1 . . . G k }. The basic idea is similar to MRC, i.e., iterates on all the nodes and tries to isolate each of them in a backup topology. Additionally, we adjust the order of isolated node to satisfy constraint (2) . To reduce the likelihood that routing paths in different backup topologies shares a same link, we apply the link perturbation procedure [14] in each backup topology. Due to space constraints, the detailed algorithm can be found in the technical report [18] .
D. Splicing Module
The splicing module refers to the reactive recovery at the controller. Its goal is, upon detecting multiple failures, delivering the failed traffic to its destination with minimal recovery delay. It first constructs a multigraph G temp by adding edges from k shortest path spanning trees in {G 1 . . . G k } excluding the failed edges. If the destination is reachable on G temp , this module computes new path p on G temp , and returns splicing actions based on p. The detailed algorithm can be found in the technical report [18] .
For ease of understanding, we take the network given in Fig. 2 as an example. First, consider the route of a flow with (src=1, dst=3), when node 2 and node 4 failed simultaneously. Node 1 detects the failure and tries to tag the packet with 1 and forward it to node 4, which also fails. Thus, without splicing, node 1 has to drop the packet. Fig. 3 shows G temp constructed based on three spanning trees rooted at node 3 excluding the failed nodes and associated links. The path between 1 and 3 on G temp is 1 → 6 → 7 → 5 → 3, according to Fig. 3 , route 1 → 6 is based on G 2 , route 6 → 7 → 5 → 3 is based on G 3 , thus splicing actions generated by the controller is: 1) at node 1, assign the tag 2 to packets destined for node 3. 2) at node 6, assign the tag 3 to packets destined for node 3. The actions are then installed into corresponding switches.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION WITH OPENFLOW
This section describes how the proposed approach can be implemented using OpenFlow and presents our prototype.
A. OpenFlow Switch Architecture
According to OpenFlow switch specification 1.3.3 [19] , an OpenFlow logical switch consists one or more flow tables and a group table, and one or more OpenFlow channels to an external controller. In each table, flow entries match packets in priority order. Each group entry contains a list of action buckets. Each action bucket in fast failover group is associated with a specific port and/or group that controls its liveness.
B. Prototype with OpenFlow
Since each action bucket's liveness is controlled by a specific port. A straightforward implementation is to install all the routes of T, T 1 . . . T k into the group table. However, the number of group table's entries is normally limited. Other than that, we only install routes of T, T 1 . . . T k that associated with a common switch port into the group table, thus significantly reducing the number that to be installed into the group table. Note that T and T 1 . . . T k may point to the same entry in the group table, thus actions based on the same port's liveness of the group table should be distinguished between normal packets and tagged packets. To achieve this, we install additional |switch ports| group entries into the group table. Fig. 4 explains our prototype architecture.
In Fig. 4 , entries are divided into two types, i.e., matching MPLS tag entries (here, we use MPLS field of a packet to distinguish from the normal packet) with higher priority and matching destination with normal priority. Entries in Table 0 Table 0   Table i Group Table   d Note that the order of the action buckets matters because the buckets are evaluated in the order defined, and the first live bucket is executed. An example can be found in the technical report [18] .
C. Recovery Time Analysis
For failures that can be locally handled, the recovery time is approximately the LOS (Loss of Signal) detection time. For failures that need to be sent to the controller, note that according to OpenFlow specification, when there is a change in the state of a port caused by a failure, an OpenFlow switch sends a notification message to the controller called a port-status message. Thus the failed packet (for rerouting) and the port-status message (for localization) can be sent to the controller simultaneously. So the recovery time is approximately the LOS detection time plus one round trip time between the switch and the controller (typically tens of milliseconds [9] ) V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION This section evaluates the proposed approach in terms of the metrics defined in Section II.
A. Simulation Setting
We use both random and realistic topologies for our simulation. The random50 topology contains 50 nodes and 120 edges, the random100 topology contains 100 nodes and 211 edges. The realistic Germany backbone consists of 50 nodes and 88 edges. Both the random and realistic topologies are deployed in the area of 1200 × 1200. We implement our prototype using OpenFlow 1.3.3 [19] and NOX controller [20] and examine the prototype's performance on Mininet testbed [21] . For the throughput test, we use two PCs, one running mininet and the other running NOX controller. Iperf [22] is applied as our test tool.
We compare our SDN-based Fast and Resilient Routing against Disaster (SDN-FRRD) approach with the following algorithms for random correlated failures, MRC [17] , MRC with our Splicing Module (MRC-SM) (since the backup topologies generated by the original MRC can also be used as input of our Splicing Module) and the advanced multipath routing algorithm, Path Splicing [14] . The setting of Path Splicing is: using the same number of k backup topologies as MRC and MRC-SM, the link weight perturbation function is: weight(i, j) = (degree(i)+degree(j))/degree max where degree max is the maximal node degree and weight(i, j) ranges from 0 to 2. Fig. 5 shows the recovery ratio in term of the number of backup topologies k in the three topologies when the radius of the regional damage is 300. We can see that our approach can steadily achieve 80%-90% recovery ratio when more than 10% of nodes failed. The comparison of SDN-FRRD and MRC-SM shows the effectiveness of our algorithm in the Backup Topologies Generation Module. This is because both SDN-FRRD and MRC-SM use the same Splicing Module. The three graphs also reveal that 7 to 8 backup topologies are sufficient to achieve the maximum ratio when the network's size is around 100 nodes. Fig. 7 shows the recovery ratio in term of the failure radius when k is set to 7. Since larger k means the backup tables would consume more switch resources, network operators who have a strict limitation of switch resources can consider choosing the smallest k since the recovery ratio curve is smooth.
B. Evaluation Results

1) Recovery Ratio:
2) Stretch: Fig. 6 shows the stretch in term of k=5, 7, 9 in the three topologies. As we can see, about 90% of the stretch is below 2. Normally, larger k means more redundancies, which can lead to smaller stretches. As we can see from Fig. 5 , the three values of k achieve approximately equal recovery ratio, but in Fig. 6 , larger k tends to have smaller stretch. This leads to the trade off between cost and performance at the initialization of network, i.e., those who can afford the backup table resource cost may choose larger k to get a low stretch against multiple failures. Fig. 8 shows the receive rate on the Iperf client. A region failure occurred between the Iperf server and client at 0.3s. Packets can not be handled locally by backup tables, thus are sent to the controller. The receive rate on the client did have a sharp reduction at 0.3s, but it recovered very fast after about 10ms. The recovery time in real scenarios differs, which depends largely on the round trip time between a switch and a controller. Details can be found in Section IV-C. 4) Controller Overhead: Fig. 9 shows that when k=7, about 60% of failures are locally handled by pre-installed tables, leave about 40% overhead to the controller. As the failure radius grows bigger, the controller overhead gets heavier too. Even so, in the largest area of damages (radius=300), about half of the failures are handled locally.
3) Recovery Time:
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a SDN based architecture to enhance the reliability of network against disaster failures. We propose our algorithms for geographic-based backup topologies generation and splicing, and implement our approach by utilizing multiple tables pipeline processing and fast failover group tables of OpenFlow without any extension of current forwarding hardware. Experiments show that, by well predesigned backup topologies protection, our fast restoration approach can efficiently use the redundancy to achieve high reachability and low stretch with low controller overhead.
It is notable that the focus of this paper is mainly on reachability. We do not address the issue of congestion control and load aggregation. This issue, together with realistic experiments and further study of backup topologies generation algorithms will be included in our future work. 
